Using China Customs data that cover monthly transactions of all Chinese exporters, we investigate how Chinese exporters respond to U.S. antidumping investigations during the 2000-2006 period. Our di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis uncovers a number of …ndings: (1) the substantial trade-dampening e¤ect at the product level operates mostly at the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of exporters) rather than the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the export volume per exporter); (2) direct exporters are more likely to exit the U.S. market than trade intermediaries upon both the a¢rmative preliminary and …nal ITC determinations; (3) multi-product direct exporters are more likely to exit the U.S. market than single-product direct exporters upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination; and (4) little price adjustment to antidumping investigations are found at either the product level or …rm-product level. We then provide a coherent explanation to the aforementioned …ndings based on recent developments in trade theories.
Introduction
Despite of the increasing trend for international trade due to rounds of reduction in tari¤s and advancement in telecommunications and logistics, we have witnessed persistent and even increasing use of contingent trade protection policies (e.g., Prusa, 2001; Zanardi, 2006; Bown, 2011) . In particular, governments around the world have resorted to antidumping measures, which are permissible under the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules and regulations, to protect their …rms and industries. The widespread use of antidumping measures has intrigued economists to study its consequences. While the existing research generally focuses on the impact of antidumping measures on protected …rms and industries, 1 it is also interesting to understand the corresponding impact on a¤ected foreign exporters. 2 Moreover, in light of the burgeoning literature on …rm heterogeneity and trade, it is important to investigate how di¤erent exporters may respond to antidumping measures. This paper makes the following contributions to the literature. 3 First, on top of presenting evidence for the trade-dampening e¤ect of antidumping investigations at product level, we anatomize how the trade-dampening e¤ect operates, speci…cally, whether it is through the decrease in the number of exporters (i.e., extensive margin) or in the trade volume per exporter (i.e., intensive margin). Second, we investigate how di¤erent exporters may respond to antidumping investigations, speci…cally, the possible di¤erence between direct exporters and trade intermediaries, and that between singleproduct direct exporters and multi-products direct exporters. Third, in addition to examining the impact of antidumping investigations on trade volume, we study whether exporters adjust export prices of the concerned products. Fourth, aside from looking at the e¤ect of antidumping investigations at the point of …nal imposition of duties, we also examine its e¤ects at other important stages of the antidumping investigation process, such as initiation and preliminary decisions.
Speci…cally, our research utilizes the antidumping cases imposed by the United States (the U.S.) against Chinese exporters over the [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] period. The choice of this research setting is motivated by the fact that China has become the world's largest recipient of antidumping measures along with its rise 1 For recent studies, see, for example, Gallaway, Blonigen and Flynn (1999), Konings and Vandenbussche (2008) , and Pierce (2011) . 2 There are a few papers looking at how antidumping duties a¤ect foreign exporters' pricing behavior (Blonigen and Park, 2004) , export-destination diversi…cation (Bown and Crowley, 2006, 2007) , and FDI strategies for serving foreign markets (Blonigen, 2002) . 3 For surveys of existing studies on antidumping, see, Blonigen and Prusa (2003) and Falvey and Nelson (2006) . from an insigni…cant player in the world trade system in 1978 to the world's largest exporter. Meanwhile, the U.S. is the world's second largest initiator of antidumping cases against China, because of its rising trade de…cit with China and the apparently related losses of manufacturing jobs in the U.S. To carry out the empirical investigation, we draw data from two courses: China Customs data (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) and the World Bank global antidumping database. From the …rst data set, we obtain information of monthly export transactions at the Chinese HS-8 digit product category by all Chinese exporters to the U.S., including export volume, export value and exporter identity. From the second data set, we compile all the antidumping investigations carried out by the U.S. against Chinese exporters at the U.S. HS-10 digit product category over the 2000-2006 period, including information such as initiation date, preliminary determination dates, and …nal determination dates. The two data sets are then combined at the HS-6 digit product category, which is common to both China and the U.S.
Our identi…cation strategy relies on the comparison of outcome variables (such as export volume and export price) of exporters in the a¤ected product category (the treatment group) with those in the una¤ected product category (the control group) before and after the various important stages of the antidumping investigation process, i.e., the di¤erence-in-di¤erences method. Speci…cally, we use two alternative control groups: …rst, for a HS-6 digit product that is subject to antidumping investigations, we use as the control group all other una¤ected HS-6 digit products within the same HS-4 digit category. Second, we follow Blonigen and Park (2004) in constructing a matched control group based on the likelihood of products being subject to antidumping investigations.
Our main …ndings are summarized as follows. (1) We …nd substantial trade-dampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at HS-6 digit product level at both the date of a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination and the date of a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. Speci…cally, the a¢rma-tive preliminary ITC determination causes the growth of trade volume for the treatment group to lag behind that for the control group by around 32% during the period between the preliminary and …nal ITC determinations. The a¢rmative …nal ITC determination causes the growth of trade volume for the treatment group to further lag behind that for the control group by 65 66% after the …nal ITC determination and until the end of our sample period. (2) We show that the trade-dampening e¤ect operates mostly at the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of exporters) rather than the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the export volume per exporter). Speci…cally, the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination causes the growth of the number of exporters for the treatment group to lag behind that for the control group by around 16% during the period between the preliminary and …nal ITC determinations. And the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination causes the growth of the number of exporters for the treatment group to further lag behind that for the control group by 17% 18% after the …nal ITC determination and until the end of our sample period. (3) In response to antidumping investigations, direct exporters are found to be more likely to exit the U.S. market than trade intermediaries upon both the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination and the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. Meanwhile, we …nd that multi-product direct exporters are more likely to exit the U.S. market than single-product direct exporters upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. (4) We …nd little Freight On Board (F.O.B.) export price adjustment to antidumping investigations at both the product and …rm-product level.
To understand the aforementioned empirical …ndings, we draw insights from the recent developments in …rm heterogeneity and trade. As the F.O.B. export prices are found to barely change, the …nal sales prices in the U.S. are expected to increase following the imposition of antidumping duties (unless the U.S. importers or retailers completely absorb these antidumping duties, which is an unlikely scenario). The increase in the …nal sales prices in the U.S. subsequently leads to a decline in the demand of the concerned products, which explains the observed substantial trade-dampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at the product level.
At the status quo, the shrinking market demand would lead to a decrease in …rm revenue across the board, which then causes some exporters to incur losses in the and consequently exit the U.S. market. For example, in the framework of constant markups and …xed costs of exporting (e.g., Melitz, 2003) , some less productive exporters may …nd their revenues not large enough to cover the …xed costs of exporting. In a framework of variable markups (e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) , the decrease in …rm revenue leads to a fall in …rm markups, as a result of which some less productive exporters may …nd their revenue not large enough to cover the variable costs. Under the new equilibrium, however, it is possible that the surviving (and the more productive) exporters could maintain their export volume by absorbing some of the market share left by the exiting exporters.
The observed di¤erence in the exit likelihood between trade intermediaries and direct exporters can be explained by a model of exporting behavior in the presence of trade intermediaries (e.g., Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei, 2011; Lu, Lu, and Tao, 2011). Speci…cally, the more productive manufacturers choose to export directly by themselves (these manufacturers are referred to as direct exporters), whereas the less productive manufacturers choose to export through trade intermediaries (these manufacturers are referred to as indirect exporters). The decrease in …rm revenue due to antidumping investigations causes some (less productive) direct exporters switch to export through trade intermediaries and makes some (less productive) indirect exporters exit the U.S. market. As a result, the e¤ect on trade intermediaries is muted as they lose some old clients but also gain some new ones.
The observed di¤erences in the exit likelihood between single-product direct exporters and multi-product direct exporters can be explained by the resource reallocation among di¤erent products within the multi-product producers (e.g., Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2011). Speci…cally, the negative shocks created by the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination may cast greater impacts on multi-product direct exporters than their single-product counterparts, as many multi-product direct exporters can reallocate resources from the a¤ected products to their other, una¤ected (especially core) products. This leads to more decrease in revenues generated from the a¤ected product category for multi-product direct exporters than their ex ante equally pro…table single-product counterparts, consequently leading to more exit of the former than the latter. However, when the second wave of negative shocks caused by the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination hits, the remaining multi-product direct exporters are those with limited room for resource reallocation (e.g., the a¤ected products are their core products). As a result, the negative shocks are expected to cast similar impacts on both single-product and multi-product direct exporters. However, as the productivity threshold of direct exporting for the remaining multi-product direct exporters is lower than that of single-product direct exporters (due to some scope economies enjoyed by the former), negative shocks of the similar magnitude cause a disproportionally more exit of the latter than the former from the U.S. market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional background of antidumping investigations in the U.S. The estimation strategy is discussed in Section 3, and data is reported in Section 4. Empirical results and then a theoretical explanation are presented in Section 5. The paper concludes with Section 6.
Institutional Background of Antidumping
Investigations in the U.S.
In this section, we brie ‡y describe the institutional context of antidumping investigations in the U.S. and its relevance to our identi…cation strategy (Staiger and Wolak, 1994 ).
In the U.S., there are two government bodies involved in the antidumping investigations, the Department of Commerce (DOC) and the International Trade Commission (ITC). The DOC determines whether an imported product under investigation is sold in the U.S. at less than its "fair value", while the ITC determines whether the imported product has materially injured the relevant U.S. domestic industries. Each of these two bodies makes two determinations, i.e., the preliminary and …nal determinations.
Once an antidumping petition against an imported product is …led and considered in order, the ITC …rst makes a preliminary determination within 45 days. If the determination is negative, the investigation is terminated. Otherwise (i.e., a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination), the DOC conducts its investigation and makes a preliminary determination in the next 115 days. Regardless of the DOC's preliminary determination (a¢rmative or negative), the investigation process continues. However, if the DOC's preliminary determination is a¢rmative, the importers of the a¤ected imported product have to post a cash deposit or bond to cover the dumping duties payable estimated by the DOC.
After the DOC's preliminary determination but before the ITC's …nal determination, the antidumping investigation can be terminated due to the withdrawal by the petitioners or suspended due to the agreements reached between the a¤ected foreign exporters and the DOC. If an antidumping investigation is neither terminated nor suspended, the investigation moves on to the next stage, in which the DOC makes a …nal determination within 75 days of its preliminary decision. If the DOC's …nal determination is negative, the investigation is terminated. Otherwise, the ITC has 45 (or 75) days to conduct a second round of investigation and make a …nal determination, depending on whether the DOC's preliminary determination is a¢rmative (or negative). Once both the DOC and the ITC reach a¢rmative …nal determinations, the DOC must issue an antidumping order to levy antidumping duties within 7 days.
In summary, there are …ve important date points during an antidumping investigation, the initiation, the preliminary ITC determination, the preliminary DOC determination, the …nal DOC determination, and the …nal ITC determination.
Estimation Strategy

Estimation Speci…cation
Our monthly export transaction data, in contrast to the yearly data used in most of the existing literature, allow us to investigate if there are di¤eren-tial exporters' responses to di¤erent stages of the antidumping investigation process. As noted in the Section 2, there are …ve stages in an antidumping investigation: initiation of the case, preliminary ITC determination, preliminary DOC determination, …nal DOC determination, and …nal ITC determination. Given that the DOC makes a¢rmative determinations in most of the antidumping petitions, we focus on the remaining three dates in the antidumping investigation, i.e., the initiation date, preliminary ITC determination, and …nal ITC determination. The a¢rmative …nal ITC determination leads to an imposition of dumping duties, which consequently increases the costs for the U.S. importers of the concerned export products. The a¢rma-tive preliminary ITC determination, in combination with (almost certain) a¢rmative preliminary DOC determination, would make it a requirement for the U.S. importers to pay a deposit as a bond for the expected dumping duties. Even the initiation of the antidumping investigation might have an e¤ect on U.S. importers, as it brings uncertainty to their businesses. We therefore expect progressively negative responses of exporters to the three stages of the antidumping investigation (initiation, preliminary ITC determination, and …nal ITC determination).
To identify the possible e¤ects of antidumping investigations, we employ the di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DID) estimation strategy at both the product level (de…ned at HS-6 digit) and the …rm-product level. Speci…cally, we exploit two sources of variations, time variation (before and after a critical date point of the antidumping investigation process) and cross-sectional variation (a¤ected products/…rms or the treatment group, and una¤ected products/…rms or the control group). The identi…cation relies on the comparison of the outcome variables of the treatment group with those of the control group both before and after the relevant stages of the antidumping investigation process.
The estimation speci…cation at the product-level takes the following form
where y pt is the outcome variable (i.e., the logarithm of export volume, the logarithm of the number of exporters, and the logarithm of export price) for product p in month t; T reatment p is a dummy variable, taking value of 1 if product p belongs to the treatment group (i.e., being investigated for dumping) and 0 otherwise; p is the product dummy, capturing all timeinvariant product characteristics; t is the month dummy, capturing common e¤ects to all products in the same month; and " pt is an error term. The three time variables corresponding to the three date points of the antidumping investigation process are constructed as follows,
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where t p0 is the date of the initiation (speci…cally, the month in which the case is initiated) for product p; t p1 is the date of the preliminary ITC determination for product p; and t p2 is the date of the …nal ITC determination for product p. The coe¢cients of interest in this study are: 1 , 2 and 3 . To deal with the potential heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we cluster the standard errors at the product-level (see Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan, 2004).
The estimation speci…cation for the …rm-product level analysis is similar to equation (1) , with the only change being the replacement of the outcome variable y pt at the product level by those at the …rm-product level.
Estimation Issues
Before proceeding to the next section on data, we discuss a few estimation issues in this sub-section.
First, we construct two alternative sets of control groups. The …rst set of control group encompasses all una¤ected products/…rms within the same HS-4 digit product category where the a¤ected products/…rms belong to (referred to as Control Group 1 ). The second set of control group is a matched group (referred to as Control Group 2 ), constructed using the method of Blonigen and Park (2004) . Speci…cally, we …rst estimate the probability of a product being charged with antidumping duties (see Table A .1 of the Appendix for the logit regression results). The variables that are used to predict the probability of being investigated for dumping include the import value of the product, real GDP growth rate in the U.S., exchange rate index, a dummy variable indicating whether the product was previously charged with antidumping duties, and HS 4-digit product dummy, similar to those used by Blonigen and Park (2004) . The matched control group are those una¤ected products that have predicted probabilities at least equal to 75th percentile of the predicted probability of the treatment group (see also Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008; Pierce, 2011) .
Second, the consistent estimation of f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g hinges upon the assumption that the di¤erence in the error term of the pre-and post-antidumping investigation period for the treatment group is the same as the corresponding one for the control group, i.e.,
With a panel data of multiple periods and multiple groups, we conduct two validity checks following Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Imbens and Wooldridge (2009). Firstly, to explicitly check whether there is any difference in time trends between the treatment and control groups before the initiation of antidumping investigation, we add an additional regressor, T reatment p P re pt , where
and the corresponding regression equation becomes
Any statistical signi…cance of 0 would indicate di¤erences in time trends between the treatment and control groups before the initiation of the antidumping investigation, thereby invalidating the DID estimation. Secondly, to allow for the possibility that di¤erent HS-6 digit products may have di¤erent time trends, we further include product-speci…c linear time trends and estimate the following equation
A valid DID estimation requires that f 1 ; 2 ; 3 g remain robust to the inclusion of product-speci…c time trend ( p t).
Data
Our study draws on data from two sources. The …rst is China Customs Data for the 2000-2006 period. This data set cover monthly import or export transaction of every Chinese exporter or importer, including speci…cally product information (classi…ed at the Chinese HS-8 digit level), trade volume, trade value, identity of Chinese exporters or importers, and export destination or importing countries. As our analysis focuses on the antidumping cases by the U.S. against Chinese exporters, we extract information about the monthly export transactions by Chinese exporters to the U.S. The second data source is the Global Antidumping Database (GAD) from the World Bank, covering all antidumping cases from 1980 to 2010 in the world. The GAD has detailed information on each antidumping case, such as product information (classi…ed at the U.S. HS-10 digit level), initiation date, preliminary determination dates, and …nal determination dates. For our analysis, we collect all U.S. antidumping cases against China during our sample period (i.e., [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . There are a total of 47 cases. Two cases (one in early 2000 and the other in late 2006) are dropped as there is not enough pre-or post-antidumping period for us to carry out DID estimation. Next, three cases are dropped because they overlapped with earlier antidumping cases in the same HS-6 product categories (see also Konings and Vandenbussche, 2008) . 28 cases out of the remaining 42 cases ended up with a¢rmative …nal ITC determination (referred to as successful cases); 5 out of the 6 cases that had a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination received negative …nal ITC determination (referred to as unsuccessful cases) and 1 was withdrawn before the …nal ITC determination (referred to as withdrawn cases); and, …nally, 8 cases were either withdrawn before the preliminary ITC determination or given the negative preliminary ITC determination (referred to as terminated cases). As our analysis looks into the e¤ects of antidumping at the three di¤erent stages of the antidumping investigation (i.e., initiation, preliminary ITC determination, and …nal ITC determination), we focus on a sample of 28 successful cases in the main analysis. For a robustness check, we include the unsuccessful and withdrawn cases, and …nd our results remain qualitatively the same. 4 See Table A We match the two data sets (i.e., China customs data and the GAD) at the HS-6 digit level, the most disaggregated level at which the two data are comparable. The matched panel data from 2000 to 2006 contain 16,302 product-month level observations and 800,079 …rm-product-month level observations. And among the 346 HS-6 digit product categories contained in the matched data, 81 product categories are successfully charged with antidumping duties. 5 One of the focuses of this paper is to investigate the possible heterogeneous response to antidumping investigations in light of the recent literature on …rm heterogeneity and trade. We …rst follow the method developed by Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) for the same data to divide …rms of our sample into trade intermediaries and direct exporters. Speci…cally, trade intermediaries are identi…ed as those …rms whose names contain Chinese characters with the English-equivalent meaning of importer, exporter, and/or trading. Furthermore, we divide the sample of direct exporters into two types, single-product …rms and multi-product …rms. Speci…cally, a …rm is identi…ed as a multi-product …rm if it exports more than one HS-6 digit products before the initiation of antidumping investigations. For those products that were subject to antidumping investigations during our sample period, there were 9,356 exporters before the initiation of the antidumping investigations. 3,465 of them were trade intermediaries. Among the remaining 5,891 direct exporters, 627 …rms were single-product direct exporters.
As the monthly data is quite noisy, we conduct a robustness check with the quarterly instead of monthly data. Meanwhile, to further alleviate the concerns of outlying observations, we experiment with excluding the top and bottom 1% of the data. Furthermore, as other countries across the world may conduct antidumping investigations of the same products as does the U.S. in the same period, this may confound our results. To alleviate this concern, we experiment with excluding those cases (i.e., all together 4 cases) that were also under antidumping investigations in some other countries.
Empirical Findings
In this section, we …rst provide our four, baseline empirical …ndings regarding how exporters respond to antidumping investigations in Section 5.1-5.4. Then we present a series of robustness checks on the validity of our DID estimation and other econometric concerns in Section 5.5. Finally, drawing recent developments in trade theories, we provide a coherent explanation for our empirical …ndings in Section 5.6.
Product-level Quantity Response
We begin by examining the possible trade-dampening e¤ect of antidumping investigations at product level. Before presenting regression results regarding equation (1), we plot time trends of export volume for the treatment and control groups over the pre-and post-antidumping investigation periods in Figures 1a-1d . The upper panel reports the results obtained using Control Group 1 (i.e., all una¤ected HS-6 digit products within the same HS-4 digit product category where the a¤ected product belongs to), while the lower panel reports the results obtained using Control Group 2 (i.e., the matched control group following Blonigen and Park, 2004) . The left panel reports time trends of export volume separately for the treatment group and the respective control group, while the right panel reports the time trend of the di¤erence in export volume between the treatment group and the respective control group. In each …gure, there are three vertical dotted dash lines, from the left to the right, marking respectively the date points of the initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary ITC determination, and the …nal ITC determination.
A few results emerge from these …gures. First, there is clearly an upward trend in export volume of both the treatment and control groups before the initiation of the antidumping investigation, consistent with the general trend of increasing Chinese exports to the U.S. in the past decades. Second, more importantly, before the initiation of the antidumping investigation, the treatment and control groups do not exhibit any di¤erential time trends, implying that there is no selection on the outcome variable and hence the validity of our DID estimation. Third, there is a clear dampening e¤ect of antidumping investigations on export volume of the treatment group, consistent with the …ndings in the literature (e.g., Prusa, 2001; Egger and Nelson, 2011). Fourth, regarding the e¤ects of the three di¤erent stages of the antidumping investigations, we observe signi…cant e¤ects of both the a¢rmative preliminary and a¢rmative …nal ITC determinations but not the initiation of the investigation (see also Staiger and Wolak, 1994) .
Regression results corresponding to equation (1) are reported in Table  1 , where Control Group 1 and Control Group 2 are used respectively in Column 1 and Column 2. It is found that both 2 and 3 are negative and statistically signi…cant at 1% level, while 1 is negative albeit statistically insigni…cant, which are consistent with the …ndings revealed in Figures 1a-1d . The marginal impact of the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination can be calculated as^ 2 ^ 1 = 0:322 (from Column 1) or 0:315 (from Column 2), both signi…cant at 1% level. Meanwhile, the marginal impact of the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination can be calculated as^ 3 ^ 2 = 0:651 (from Column 1) or 0:665 (from Column 2), both signi…cant at 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination causes the growth of export volume for the treatment group to lag behind that for the control group by around 32% during the period between the preliminary and …nal ITC determinations. The a¢rmative …nal ITC determination causes the growth of export volume for the treatment group to further lag behind that for the control group by 65 67% after the …nal ITC determination and until the end of our sample period. 6 
Extensive versus Intensive Margins
Now that we have documented a substantial dampening e¤ect of the antidumping investigations on export volume, we next anatomize this e¤ect by investigating its underlying mechanism. Speci…cally, we look at the e¤ect of antidumping investigations on both the number of exporters to the U.S. (extensive margin e¤ect) and the export volume per exporter (intensive margin e¤ect).
Figures 2a-2d plot time trends of the number of exporters for the treatment and control groups over the pre-and post-antidumping investigation periods. Clearly, there is a signi…cant decrease in the number of exporters caused by the antidumping investigations. Speci…cally, after the initiation but before the preliminary ITC determination, there is barely any change in the number of exporters. However, after the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, the number of exporters decreases sharply, followed by another substantial decrease upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination.
Figures 3a-3d present time trends of export volume per exporter for the treatment and control groups over the pre-and post-antidumping investigation periods. Similar to the results on the extensive margin, there is a decrease in the export volume per exporter upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, followed by another decrease upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination.
Note that in the above analysis on the extensive margin e¤ect we divide the total export volume by the total number of exporters. That is, for the pre-investigation period, we include those exporters that eventually exited from the US market due to the antidumping investigations, and for the post-investigation period we include those new entrants into the US export market. As a result the aforementioned intensive margin results (Figures  3a-3d) could be compounded by the exit and entry of exporters. To address this possible concern, we carry out anaother intensive margin e¤ect analysis, i.e., for those surviving exporters. Figures 4a-4d present time trends of export volume of surviving exporters and their control groups over the preand post-antidumping investigation periods. Interestingly, in contrast to the aforementioned intensive margin results for all exporters, there is no clear di¤erential time trend between export volume of surviving exporters and their control groups both before and after the antidumping investigation. In other words, we do not …nd evidence for the intensive-margin e¤ect, and the patterns shown in Figures 3a-3d are mainly caused by the entry and exit of exporters.
Regression results regarding the e¤ects of antidumping investigations on the number of exporters and export volume per exporter (i.e., for all exporters and for surviving exporters, separately) are reported in Table 2 . Columns 1-2 report the e¤ects on the number of exporters of the antidumping investigations for the two respective control groups. It is found that both 2 and 3 are negative and statistically signi…cant at 1% level, while 1 is negative albeit statistically insigni…cant. These results are consistent with the …nd-ings revealed in Figures 2a-2d , implying a strong extensive margin e¤ect of the antidumping investigations. In terms of economic magnitude, the a¢r-mative preliminary ITC determination causes the growth of the number of exporters for the treatment group to lag behind that for the control group by around 16% during the period between the preliminary and …nal ITC determinations (i.e.,^ 2 ^ 1 ' 0:16 with statistical signi…cance at 1% level). And the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination causes the growth of the number of exporters for the treatment group to further lag behind that for the control group by 17% 18% after the …nal ITC determination and until the end of our sample period (i.e.,^ 3 ^ 2 = 0:174 0:182 with statistical signi…cance at 1% level).
Columns 3-4 of Table 2 present the results on the export volume per exporter for all exporters of the antidumping investigations for the two respective control groups. It is found that both 2 and 3 are negative and statistically signi…cant at 1% level, consistent with the …ndings revealed in Figures 3a-3d . Columns 5-6 of Table 2 present the results on the export volume per exporter for the surviving exporters of the antidumping investigations for the two respective control groups. Clearly, none of 1 , 2 and 3 has any statistical insigni…cance at 5% level. Taken together, much of the intensive-margin e¤ect shown in Columns 3-4 of Table 2 are due to the the entry and exit of exporters, and overall there is no evidence for the intensive-margin e¤ect.
Heterogeneous Responses
In the previous section, we document a strong extensive margin e¤ect of the antidumping investigations, that is, the number of exporters fall sharply after both the a¢rmative preliminary and a¢rmative …nal ITC determinations. It is curious to know what types of exporters are relatively more likely to exit the export market at these two important dates of the antidumping investigation process. To this end, we follow the recent literature on …rm heterogeneity in …rst looking at the di¤erence between trade intermediaries and direct exporters, and then at the di¤erence between single-product and multi-product direct exporters. Table 3 reports the regression results regarding the di¤erential likelihood to exit the U.S. market between trade intermediaries and direct exporters, with Columns 1-3 focusing on the exit upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination and Columns 4-6 focusing on the exit upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. An exporter is classi…ed as exiting the U.S. market upon a¢rmative preliminary (…nal) ITC determination if it does not export any of the a¤ected HS-6 digit products after the a¢rmative preliminary (…nal) ITC determination (denoted as Exit). Meanwhile, we construct a dummy variable called T rade Intermediary, which takes value of 1 if the exporter is a trade intermediary and 0 otherwise. The regression speci…cation is as follows:
Exit f p = T rade Intermediary f p + p + " f p :
As shown in Columns 1 and 4 of Table 3 , T rade Intermediary has negative and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢cients, suggesting that trade intermediaries are less likely to exit the U.S. market of the a¤ected products than direct exporters upon both the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination and the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. These results are robust to the control for …rm e¢ciency (proxied by either export volume of the affected products in Columns 2 and 5, or export price of the a¤ected products in Columns 3 and 6). Meanwhile, it is interesting to observe that …rms with larger quantity of export volume or lower prices are less likely to exit, consistent with the …ndings in the literature on …rm heterogeneity (e.g., Melitz, 2003) .
In Table 4 , we examine the relative likelihood of exit from the U.S. market of the a¤ected products between single-product and multi-product direct exporters upon both the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination and the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. We construct an alternative dummy variable called Single P roduct, which takes value of 1 if the direct exporter is a single-product direct exporter and 0 otherwise, and then regress the outcome variable Exit on Single P roduct along with a list of HS-6 digit product dummy, i.e.,
Columns 1-3 of Table 4 report the results regarding the likelihood of exit upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination. It is found that Single P roduct has a negative and statistically signi…cant estimated coe¢cient, regardless of the control for …rm e¢ciency. Interestingly, however, the estimated coe¢cients of Single P roduct become positive and statistically signi…cant when we examine the likelihood of exit upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination (Columns 4-6 of Table 4 ). Together, our results suggest that single-product direct exporters are less likely to exit the U.S. market of the a¤ected products than multi-product direct exporters upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination.
Price Response
We now proceed to the analysis of possible e¤ects of antidumping investigation on export prices (i.e., F.O.B. prices charged by Chinese exporters), …rst at product level and then …rm-product level.
Figures 5a-5d present time trends of export prices of a¤ected HS-6 digit products and their control groups over the pre-and post-antidumping investigation periods. Interestingly, there is no clear di¤erential time trend of export prices between the treatment and control groups both before and after the antidumping investigation. Figures 5b and 5d clearly show that the di¤erence in export prices between the treatment and control group is quite ‡at throughout the whole period despite some ‡uctuations.
Figures 6a-6d present time trends of export prices of a¤ected products of surviving …rms and those of their control groups over the pre-and postantidumping investigation periods. Still, we …nd no clear di¤erential time trend of export prices between the treatment and control groups both before and after the antidumping investigation. Moreover, Figures 6b and 6d clearly demonstrate little di¤erence in export prices of a¤ected products of surviving …rms and those of their control groups throughout the whole period despite some ‡uctuations.
Regression results regarding the e¤ects of antidumping investigation on export prices are reported in Table 5 , with Columns 1-2 for the product level analysis and Columns 3-4 for the …rm-product level analysis. It is found that, with only one exception (the impact of …nal ITC determination in productlevel analysis involving Control Group 2, which is signi…cant at 5% level), there is no signi…cant e¤ect of the antidumping investigation on export prices at both product and …rm-product levels, consistent with the results revealed in Figures 5a-5d and 6a-6d.
Robustness Checks
In this Section, we conduct a series of robustness checks on the aforementioned DID estimation for all the relevant outcome variables examined in the Section 5.1-5.4 (i.e., logarithm of export volume at the HS-6 digit product level, the logarithm of the number of exporters, the logarithm of export volume per exporters for all exporters, the logarithm of export volume of surviving exporters, the logarithm of export price at the HS-6 digit product level, and the logarithm of export price of surviving exporters).
First, the validity of our DID estimation hinges upon the assumption that the treatment and control groups are comparable before the treatment happens. To explicitly check whether there is any di¤erence in time trends between the treatment and control groups before the initiation of antidumping investigation, we conduct a robustness check according to equation (7). Estimation results are summarized in Table A .3 of the Appendix. Clearly, there is no evidence for any di¤erential time trends between the treatment and control groups before the initiation of antidumping investigation, hence implying the validity of our DID estimations. Meanwhile, our main …ndings on the e¤ects of antidumping investigation remain robust.
Second, one may be concerned that products in the treatment group and their counterparts in the control group may follow di¤erent time trends. To address this concern, we allow for product-speci…c time trend in our estimation, i.e., equation (8) . Estimation results are reported in Table A .4 of the Appendix. Clearly, our main …ndings on the e¤ects of antidumping investigation remain robust to the inclusion of product-speci…c time trend, implying the validity of our DID estimations.
Third, to alleviate the concern that our monthly data could be noisy as not all exporters have export to the U.S. in every month, we conduct a robustness check by using quarterly instead of monthly data (i.e., aggregation of monthly export transactions to the quarterly level). Regression results are reported in Table A .5 of the Appendix. It is found that, on top of the statistically signi…cant impacts of antidumping investigations reported earlier, the …nal ITC determination has a negative and signi…cant (at 5% level) impact on the export volume of surviving exporters (i.e., some limited evidence for the intensive margin e¤ect). In addition, the magnitudes of the e¤ects for the sample of quarterly data are much bigger.
Fourth, to further address the concern that our results may be a¤ected by some outlying observations, we focus on a sub-sample without the top and bottom 1% observations. Regression results reported in Table A .6 of the Appendix show the robustness of our earlier …ndings, and o¤er limited evidence for the intensive margin e¤ect.
Fifth, note that in Sections 5.1-5.4, we only include successful antidumping cases (i.e., 28 cases with a¢rmative preliminary and a¢rmative …nal ITC determinations out of 42 antidumping cases), partly because we would like to investigate the di¤erential impacts of the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination and the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. To check whether our main results are sensitive to the selection of the antidumping cases, we conduct a robustness check by including the 5 unsuccessful cases and 1 withdrawn case. Regression results are reported in Table A .7 of the Appendix. It is found that our main results regarding the e¤ects of antidumping investigation remain the same as reported earlier. 7 Sixth, it is possible that other countries may conduct the antidumping investigation of the same products as the U.S. during the same period, thereby confounding the e¤ects of the U.S. antidumping investigation on Chinese exporters and complicating the interpretation of our results. To address this concern, we conduct a robustness check by excluding such overlapping antidumping cases (i.e., 4 cases). Regression results are reported in Table A .8 of the Appendix. Clearly, our main …ndings remain robust to this sub-sample.
Discussion
In the previous sections, we have uncovered how exporters respond to antidumping investigation. The main …ndings can be summarized as: substantial trade-dampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at HS-6 digit product level a sharp decrease in the number of exporters but little change in the export volume per exporter direct exporters more likely to exit the U.S. market than trade intermediaries multi-product direct exporters more likely to exit the U.S. market than single-product direct exporters upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination little adjustment in the F.O.B. export prices to antidumping investigations at both the HS-6 digit product level and …rm-product level
In what follows, drawing on recent developments in trade literature, we o¤er a coherent explanation to the above empirical …ndings.
The …nding of little change in F.O.B. export prices is understandable in the setup of U.S. antidumping investigation against Chinese exporters. On the one hand, it is not rational for Chinese exporters to lower the F.O.B. export prices, as that would exacerbate their position in the antidumping investigations. On the other hand, Chinese exporters may not have any bargaining power vis-à-vis their U.S. importers to increase their F.O.B. export prices, as they are generally fragmented and tend to concentrate in low-valueadded manufacturing.
Given the little change in the F.O.B. export prices, it is expected that the …nal sales prices of the concerned export products in the U.S. market would generally increase, due to the imposition of antidumping duties and some pass-through by U.S. importers or retailers. The increase in the …nal sales prices in the U.S. market subsequently leads to a decline in the demand of the concerned products, which explains the observed substantial tradedampening e¤ects of antidumping investigations at the product level.
At the status quo, the shrinking market demand would lead to a decrease in …rm revenue across the board. In a world with constant markups and product-speci…c …xed costs of exporting (i.e., Melitz, 2003) , some less productive …rms may …nd their revenues not large enough to cover the …xed costs and hence exit the U.S. market. In a world with variable markups (even without …xed costs of exporting, e.g., Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) , …rms would encounter a decrease in their markups, as a result of which some less productive …rms incur losses and hence exit the U.S. market. Under the new equilibrium, however, due to the exit of less productive exporters from the U.S. market, it is possible that the surviving (and the more productive) exporters could maintain their export volume by absorbing some of the market share left over by the exiting exporters.
The decrease in …rm revenues may cast di¤erent pressures on di¤erent types of exporters in their likelihood of exit. For example, we observe that trade intermediaries are less likely to exit the U.S. market following antidumping investigations than direct exporters. This can be explained in a model of exporting behavior in the presence of trade intermediaries. Specifically, Ahn, Khandelwal, and Wei (2011) and Lu, Lu, and Tao (2011) show that the more productive manufacturers choose to export directly by themselves (these manufacturers are referred to as direct exporters), whereas the less productive manufacturers choose to export through trade intermediaries (these manufacturers are referred to as indirect exporters). The decrease in …rm revenues due to antidumping investigations causes some (less productive) indirect exporters to exit the U.S. market, and at the same time makes some (less productive) direct exporters switch to export through trade intermediaries. As a result, the number of trade intermediaries may change relatively smaller than that of direct exporters, as trade intermediaries lose some old clients but also gain some new ones.
We also observe that multi-product direct exporters more likely to exit the U.S. market than single-product direct exporters upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination, but the opposite holds upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination. One possible explanation lies in the ease of resource reallocation among di¤erent products within the multi-product direct exporters relative to their single-product counterparts (e.g., Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2011). Speci…cally, due to the scope economies (e.g., some market-speci…c …xed costs of exporting regardless of the number of exported products), the productivity threshold of direct exporting for multi-product direct exporters is lower than that for single-product direct exporters. This is consistent with the fact that much more multi-product direct exporters are observed in the sample than single-product direct exporters.
The a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination generates negative shocks on both single-product and multi-product direct exporters, by reducing their revenues generated from the a¤ected product category. However, such negative impact is stronger for multi-product direct exporters than their singleproduct counterparts, consequently leading to more exit of the former relative to the latter from the U.S. market of the a¤ected products. This is because in response to the decrease in revenues generated from the a¤ected product category, multi-product direct exporters would reallocate their resources away from the a¤ected products to their existing, una¤ected products (especially when the a¤ected products are not their core products). As a result, these multi-product direct exporters earn less revenue from the a¤ected products than their ex ante equally pro…table single-product counterparts. Furthermore, in a world with constant markups but some product-speci…c …xed costs of exporting, such resource reallocation makes multi-product direct exporters less likely to break even in the and hence more likely to exit the U.S. market of the a¤ected products. In a world with variable markups, the further reduction in revenues due to the resource reallocation further lowers markups of multi-product direct exporters, causing losses in the and hence exit from the U.S. market of the a¤ected products.
Upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination, there will be a second wave of negative shocks on both single-product and multi-product direct exporters. However, given that the remaining multi-product direct exporters are those having limited room for resource reallocation away from the a¤ected products (e.g., the a¤ected products are their core products), such negative shocks are expected to cast similar impacts on both single-product and multiproduct direct exporters. As the productivity threshold of direct exporting for the remaining multi-product direct exporters is lower than that of singleproduct direct exporters, negative shocks of the similar magnitude cause a disproportionally more exit of the latter than the former from the U.S. market.
Conclusion
Antidumping measures have become a popular tool for governments to protect their domestic …rms and industries. Much insight has been gained from a large and growing literature on how e¤ective the antidumping measures are in trade protection. An equally important but overlooked issue is how antidumping measures a¤ect the behavior of foreign exporters, the understanding of which should help us gain a complete picture of the e¤ectiveness of the antidumping measures.
In this paper, we use China Customs data to investigate how Chinese exporters respond to U.S. antidumping investigations of their products during the 2000-2006 period. To identify the e¤ects of antidumping investigation, we use the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation, i.e., the comparison of outcome variables of exporters in the a¤ected product category with those in the una¤ected product category before and after the various important stages of the antidumping investigation process. We …nd that much of the tradedampening e¤ect of antidumping investigations at product level operates through the extensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the number of exporters) rather than the intensive margin (i.e., a decrease in the export volume per exporter). We also …nd that the decrease in the number of exporters is contributed by direct exporters as opposed to trade intermediaries, and by …rst multi-product direct exporters (i.e., upon the a¢rmative preliminary ITC determination) and then their single-product counterparts (i.e., upon the a¢rmative …nal ITC determination). Moreover, we detect little price adjustments to antidumping investigations at both the product level and …rm-product level. Finally, drawing recent developments in trade theories, we o¤er a coherent explanation to our empirical …ndings on how exporters respond to antidumping investigations. This paper contributes to the existing literature on antidumping by examining the e¤ect of antidumping measures on the a¤ected …rms rather than the protected …rms. Meanwhile, it provides further evidence regarding exporting behavior across di¤erent types of …rms, i.e., trade intermediaries versus direct exporters, and single-versus multi-product exporters. It also complements the literature on trade liberalization by documenting the resource reallocation across …rms and across products within …rms in response to the negative shocks in the trade environment. Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. . The three references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. The three references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. Note: The upper panel reports the results obtained using control group 1, whereas the lower panel reports the results obtained using control group 2. The left panel reports time trends of the treatment and control groups separately, whereas the right panel reports the time trend of the difference between the treatment and control groups. . The three references lines mark respectively the date points of initiation of the antidumping investigation, the preliminary and final ITC determination. 
